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GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 
(Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans., 
LexisNexis 2014) 
Reviewed by Jean-Claude Gémar

 
Law dictionaries are legion, translations of law dictionaries are 
few, especially from French into English due to the deep-seated 
differences between French Civil Law’s and Common Law’s 
concepts and systems. Translating is a high-risk activity, all the 
more so when law and its critical consequences are involved. The 
phrase traduttore traditore continues to undermine the very idea of 
translation in the eyes of so many. If everything can be translated, 
many doubt that this translation specialists’ dogma can apply to the 
translation of legal texts. Furthermore, translators must not 
underestimate how laws are drafted, the style of which can vary, 
sometimes considerably, from one language to another. This is the 
case, among many other pairs of legal languages, for English and 
French: their writing styles differ dramatically, and particularly in 
the development of their legal texts. Translators are thus faced with 
the problem of conceptual incongruity between languages. 
Linguistic scholars believe the congruity of words between 
languages is purely by chance.  
IS LAW TRANSLATABLE? 
Such statements suggest that untranslatability would be 
inevitable. In view of the particular constraints of legal translation, 
especially when texts of national interest are involved, as in 
Canada, the question arises whether legal translation is still 
possible. It is true that if one focuses on the concepts covered by 
the key terms in the vocabularies of the main legal systems and if 
one makes a comparative analysis, term for term, one ends up most 
of the time, for lack of perfect equivalence, at the impossibility of 
translation. Few specialists—most of them jurists—accept the 
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feasibility of translation. They think it does not really produce the 
claimed legal equivalence. Many reasons or obstacles are put 
forward, among them the uniqueness of legal systems, of their 
specific concepts, terms and language. Prejudices, preconceived 
ideas, not to mention ignorance, increase their impact. 
Therefore, one needs a good amount of courage and 
consistency, possibly a touch of madness, to embark on this 
odyssey and tread new territory: translating into English Cornu’s 
respected Vocabulaire juridique (9th ed., 2011), and, no doubt, the 
reigning law dictionary in the French-speaking realm. A 
formidable task, if any, when one considers with Cornu
1
 that “the 
language of the law is, to a major extent, a legacy of tradition,”2 
and filled with culture-bound terms. Legal notions are sometimes 
so abstract and singular, so culturally bound to a local system, its 
traditions and customs,
3
 that many lawyers and linguists alike 
question the translatability of law.  
However, specialists in comparative law are best placed to deal 
not only with the problems posed by the language of law, its 
words, terms and phrases, but also with the concepts and notions 
they convey when transferred from one legal system to another. It 
is not surprising one finds among comparativists able specialists in 
legal translation, as are Professors Alain Levasseur and Marie-
Eugénie Laporte-Legeais who, in an international joint venture 
conducted by Association Henri Capitant and Poitiers’ Juriscope, 
coordinated and supervised the team who translated the 
Vocabulaire juridique in order to produce the Dictionary of the 
Civil Code under review.  
To start with some striking facts and figures, Cornu’s 
Vocabulaire juridique (10th ed., 2014) contains over 5,000 entries 
                                                                                                             
 1. Professor Gérard Cornu passed away in 2007. He was 81.  
 2. GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiii (Alain Levasseur 
& Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Lageais trans., LexisNexis 2014) [hereinafter 
DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE]. 
 3. Compare droits de l’Homme vs habeas corpus, terms not addressed in 
the Dictionary. 




within over 1,000 pages (1,099, to be precise), when the 
Dictionary of the Civil Code contains less than 3,000 (c. 2,800) 
within 663 pages. The some 2,000-entry difference lies in the 
notion-based corpus selected, which is composed of some 1,600 
essential notions. Not all terms, notions and entries of the 
Vocabulaire juridique were judged relevant and worth being 
retained to be translated and incorporated in a dictionary of the 
Civil Code. See for example: anomal, concordat, concours, 
consulaire, distraction, distrat, éthique, étoc, fourrière, incoterm, 
litisconsorts, mission, nouveauté, obligataire, perquisition, 
préjudiciel, réfugié, requérir, sécularisation, soumission, staries, 
superficie, taille, tontine, usance, ventilation, vétusté, voluptuaire, 
and so on, were retained terms bearing a notion, a legal institution 
that matter, representing more or less the basic terminology 
carrying the essential notions of private law, which amounts to 
some 2,000 terms, as the first edition (1985) of Quebec’s 
Dictionnaire de droit privé demonstrated. 
The Dictionary of the Civil Code’s entries (pp. 1–591), as is the 
case with most dictionaries, are presented in alphabetical order. 
They are preceded by a short Foreword (p. ix), the authors’ 
Approach to Translation (pp. xiii–xiv), the Foreword written by 
Prof. Philippe Malinvaud for the original edition (pp. xv–xvi) and 
by excerpts of the Preface of the original edition (pp. xvii–xx) 
written by Gérard Cornu—all translated by Alain A. Levasseur and 
J. Randall Trahan—, a list of abbreviations (pp. xxi–xxiii) and by 
some Instructions for Use (p. xxv). The Dictionary proper (pp. 1–
589) is followed by an Index of (English-French) Entries
4
 (pp. 
593–657), an Index of Legal Adages (pp. 659–62) and, finally, by 
a Louisiana Civil Code Bibliography (p. 663).  
Since we are dealing here with a translated book, the authors’ 
statements on their translation objectives and strategies are of 
                                                                                                             
 4. Each entry is introduced by the French term under consideration; the 
text of the entry is in English, the equivalent English term(s) follow the 
definition. Ex: “Demande (. . .) En. Demand, Claim, Action, Request.” 




prime importance to better grasp what they intended to accomplish, 
the purpose toward which their endeavor was directed. In 
translation, the German philologist Friedrich Schleiermacher 
forged the critical alternative, the old and obvious dualism: the 
translator’s task is to move the author to the reader, or move the 
reader to the author.  
SOURCE TEXT-ORIENTED OR READER-ORIENTED? 
In law, the issue of equivalence assumes particularly critical 
importance. Thus arises the question of translating law. Translating 
a text of a legal nature or significance comes to perform an act of 
comparative law, but coupled with a translating process 
(l’opération traduisante). In sum, that is the translator’s daunting 
task. Translating does not consist in finding matching equivalents 
that can be assembled in a chain of words making phrases and 
sentences and, eventually, a text. If translation is thought to be a 
word-for-word operation, a translator’s search à tout prix for a 
lexical equivalent to the source language in the target language, 
since linguists claim that no word possesses the exact equivalent 
meaning in another language, then one should seriously doubt the 
feasibility of translating.  
Nonetheless translating has been going on for thousands of 
years. Faced with his or her text, the translator has to adopt a 
strategy with a view to reaching the goal intended, which will 
depend on principles, and one or several methods that are more or 
less established and proven. Throughout history, sometimes 
translators have opted for a literal form of translation, sometimes 
for a freer approach to translating, without neglecting ways to 
combine them, including adaptation. Nowadays, in the quest for 
equivalence, it is the spirit, not the letter any more, that is being 
sought. It reveals a general trend in communication—writing more 
concise, plainer and simpler texts—that is reaching out to the legal 
world, where form, i.e., language, is increasingly governing law. 




Language-conscious Canada has a long and rich tradition and 
experience with translation, that necessary evil which plays such a 
decisive part in the smooth running of its institutions. Canada is the 
country where “functional equivalence”5—which may be 
compared to Nida’s “dynamic equivalence”6—has been the 
privileged method for translating Canadian statutes for decades. 
The reason?  
KEEP LAW AND FORM AND DUE PROPORTION  
(Richard II. 3.4.41) 
 
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the Dictionary’s 
authors-translators “favored ‘formal equivalence’ [source text-
oriented] over ‘dynamic equivalence’ [target text-oriented], which 
is as much as to say that we have erred on the side of literalism.”7 
They could not have put it better! But there are sound reasons 
behind this. According to Levasseur and Trahan, “in all of the 
writings of Cornu, the meaning of each word and the style of every 
sentence, far from being independent of each other, are 
inextricably bound up together.”8 This accounts for that. They 
were not translating any dictionary, they dealt with a work of legal 
doctrine, which is a magnum opus as far as substance is concerned, 
and a gem as regards writing and style. You deal with the author of 
Linguistique juridique (Legal Linguistics), a work that is the must-
have of every student of the language of law and its texts. You do 
not translate a great jurist’s words and style the way you do, say, a 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Louis-Philippe Pigeon, L’équivalence fonctionnelle in LANGAGE DU 
DROIT ET TRADUCTION : ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE—THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
LAW AND TRANSLATION: ESSAYS ON JURILINGUISTICS 271–81 (Jean-Claude 
Gémar ed., Conseil de la langue française 1983).  
 6. EUGENE A. NIDA & CHARLES R. TABER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
TRANSLATION at xiv (4th prtg., Brill 2003), (which authored the formal vs 
dynamic equivalence principle. In their system of priorities, “dynamic 
equivalence has priority over formal correspondence”). 
 7. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv. 
 8. Id. 




contract, but rather like what Peter Newmark thought of as 
“authoritative statements,”9 which is what law dictionaries are all 
about, where every word of each definition tells. One example will 
demonstrate this. It is a comparison between a definition of 
PERSONNE MORALE from the Vocabulaire juridique and its 
translation in the Dictionary of the Civil Code: 
Groupement doté, sous 
certaines conditions, d’une 
personnalité juridique plus ou 
moins complète ; sujet de droit 
fictif qui, sous l’aptitude 
commune à être titulaire de 
droit et d’obligation, est soumis 
à un régime variable, not. selon 
qu’il s’agit d’une personne 
morale de droit privé ou d’une 
personne morale de droit 
public. 
 (50 words) 
A group granted, under 
certain conditions, a more or 
less complete legal personality; 
fictitious legal/juridical person 
which, by virtue of the common 
capacity to have rights and 
obligations, is subject to a 
variable regime, depending, in 
particular, on whether it is a 
private law moral/legal/juridical 
person or a public law 
moral/legal/juridical person.  
(52 words) 
 
The “formal equivalence” is obvious. One will also notice the 
slight difference in the number of words between the French (50) 
and the English (52) versions, which confirms the fine touch of 
“literalism” since the translated text is usually longer than the 
source one—a gap which can reach 300% between English and 
Italian—,10 but not between English and French as far as statutes 
are concerned.
11
 The legal equivalence of “personne morale” and 
“legal person” reveals, as in the Quebec Civil Code (article 298), 
the priority given to civil law over common law, while in a 
                                                                                                             
 9. Peter Newmark, The Translation of Authoritative Statements: a 
Discussion, 27 META 375–91 (1982). 
 10. See Text size in Translation: http://www.w3.org/International/articles/ 
article-text-size.en, consulted on August 20, 2015. 
 11. In Canada, owing to methods of co-drafting legislation, articles in the 
French version of a statute are often shorter than the English ones. 




common law context it is the term “corporation” that would be 
appropriate, as indicated in the dictionary of common law 
produced by the Centre de traduction et de terminologie juridiques 
(CTTJ) of Moncton university Faculty of Law.
12
 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW: BACK TO THE FUTURE  
But another reason behind the decision to translate Vocabulaire 
juridique Cornu, the driving force behind the whole translating 
endeavor, “was a matter not only of promoting our Louisiana civil 
law tradition in general by anchoring it in the English language and 
not just any English language, but an English language different 
from the English language of the common law.”13 It is a manner of 
going back to the future. After all, the Louisiana civil law has been 
expressed for centuries in English (from the Digest of 1808 to the 
Louisiana Civil Code of today), and became, nolens volens, “an 
instrument for the defense of the civil law”!14 This characteristic 
feature is constantly brought out by the authors when dealing with 
major terms and notions; among many other examples, to stick to a 
few A-terms: Abandon, Abus, Acceptation, Acte sous seing privé, 
Action rédhibitoire (and Rédhibitoire), Agrément, Amiable 
(compositeur), Antichrèse, Arrhes, Authentique, Ayant cause.  
In many entries the team dealt with appears in one or several 
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Penal Code or a Louisiana 
statute, which clearly reflects the underlying common language 
identity and culture of the French civil law and Louisiana’s, at least 
since the Code Napoléon and, before that, the reminders of lois 
civiles (civil laws) of yesteryear. The cousinage between both civil 
laws stands out particularly with a term like FAUTE/FAULT and its 
so important notion of obligation. Let us compare what both Codes 
say about it. 
                                                                                                             
 12. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, GÉRARD SNOW & DONALD POIRIER, LA 
COMMON LAW DE A À Z at 382 (Yvon Blais-Bruylant 2010). 
 13. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv. 
 14. Id. at xiii. 




Louisiana Civil Code, 2011 
 
Article 2315. A. Every act 
whatever of man that causes 
damage to another obliges him 
by whose fault it happened to 
repair it. 
Code civil, 2015  
(enacted on Feb. 19, 1804) 
Article 1382 Tout fait 
quelconque de l’homme, qui 
cause à autrui un dommage, 
oblige celui par la faute duquel 
il est arrivé à le réparer. 
 
Once more, the original French article (1804) may be found, 
translated word for word, in the Louisiana Civil Code, illustrating 
the deeply-rooted French civil law culture and tradition perduring 
in the only U.S. state still maintaining a civil code.  
Each entry of the Dictionary reproduces the rich information 
compiled and skillfullly synthesized by Cornu and his expert team 
on every term they chose to enter into the Vocabulaire juridique. 
Many general entries present subentries constituted of the family 
of words comprising the key term, which at times can be 
numerous, as is the case with LOI (9 terms) FAMILLE (13 terms), or 
DROIT (43 terms!). This is in line with other dictionaries, Black’s 
Law Dictionary for example, where the entry SUCCESSION contains 
nine subentries devoted to “Civil Law and Louisiana.” Like 
Garner’s dictionary,15 but to a lesser degree, Cornu’s Vocabulaire 
juridique also gives linguistic information about the term, its 
etymology, synonyms, antonyms, semantic relations (See, Comp., 
etc.), and other useful specifications (adages, classical/dominant 
interpretation, strict/broad sense, usage), and, sometimes, a 
warning : Avoid, as for the controversial common law term “Joint 
and several.”16 This information is part of the translated entries. 
                                                                                                             
 15. B.A. GARNER, DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (3rd ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2011). 
 16. See CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at xiv (the 
authors’ remark on the civil law term solidarité, when “the only access key 
available [to understand the civil law concept of solidarité] is ‘joint and 
several’”). See also “Joint and several liability” in BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY. 




The authors of the Dictionary even went to the lengths of dealing 
with and translating the definition of older term significations. See, 
for instance, héritage (estate), the third signification of which (c. 
1228) has been used “to refer to an immovable by nature.”17 
Conveying that obsolete signification, this term is still present in 
the French Code civil (article 637) and was one of Cornu’s 
favorites (much used in the ages of Montaigne and Balzac).  
As regards translation, the translators of Vocabulaire juridique 
have accomplished a remarkable feat. As said before, translating a 
dictionary is no easy task. Some even think it is a useless, if not 
impossible, endeavor as far as law is concerned. In the case of the 
Dictionary of the Civil Code, this task turned out to be not only 
feasible but successfully accomplished, despite the fact definitions 
do not follow the same path in English and French general 
lexicographical traditions. These traditions are based upon 
linguistic theories and principles that vary from time to time in the 
manner in which a dictionary will define and inform users. In law, 
however, the difference between English and French ways of 
defining words and informing readers in law dictionaries is as large 
as the gap separating common law and civil law. Where French 
lexicographers (Capitant, Cornu) favor semantic definitions based 
on Aristotelian logic, English lexicographers (Black, Garner, 
Jowitt) lean towards pragmatics (an area of linguistics): they 
recognize there is no linguistic meaning outside of usage. Bathing 
in a written law, codified system, French jurists, unlike common-
lawyers, think the “real meaning” of a word does not, or very 
slowly, fluctuate. Lex non scripta, common law was not developed 
by legislators but almost daily, case by case, by courts. Therefore, 
the meaning of its words and terms is not cast-in-stone law, it does 
fluctuate over the course of time.  
Comparing Cornu’s and Black’s (Garner’s, in fact) ways of 
defining a term will exemplify those differences. Choose a term 
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like DOMICILE, for instance. In Cornu’s Vocabulaire juridique, the 
definition will refer you to an article of the Code civil (article 102), 
whereas Black’s Law Dictionary, like most English law 
dictionaries (see Curzon, PAJLO, Stroud), refers the reader to one 
or several cases : “Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super., 310, 213 A.2nd 
94,” and other law dictionaries may add statutes to case law 
references. It says it all: in civil law, legislation surpasses case law. 
And vice versa: in common law, “remedies precede rights” 
affirmed René David, the great French comparativist.
18
 As said 
before, the authors of Dictionary of Civil Code opted for a quasi-
litteral translation of Cornu’s definitions. This is well illustrated in 
DOMICILE: “Place where a person has his principal establishment 
(Frch. civ. C. a. 102; La. civ. C. a. 38).” Compare with Louisiana 
Civil Code (article 38): “The domicile of a natural person is the 
place of his habitual residence.” Definition followed by the usual 
references: [Acts 2008, No. 801, §1; Acts 2012, No. 713, §2, eff. 
Aug 1, 2012]. Two different ways of informing, two different 
spirits of laws. 
As for translation, a last example from the Dictionary of the 
Civil Code will help in understanding the kind of difficulties a 
translator might encounter when translating certain terms, as is the 
case for VALABLE and VALIDE. Based on what general dictionaries 
indicate, many French-speaking persons (and a great number of 
others) think these words are synonyms. This might be true, in 
certain cases, for the general language, where valide and valable 
can both be translated in English by valid, but is not the case with 
law, where the latter, not the former, may also be translated by 
lawful. This is a source of ambiguity, all the more so as valide, in 
reference to a juridical act, may apply to either a negotium “Ex. 
marriage clear, in its formation, of any ground of nullity. Syn. 
valable (sense 1),”19 or an instrumentum “Ex. passport in the 
                                                                                                             
 18. RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 330 
(6th ed., Dalloz 1974). 
 19. CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 2, at 572. 




process of being validated. Comp. valable (sense 2),”20 therefore 
conveying a critical semantic nuance, a difference that might blot 
out underlying similarities.  
TRADUTTORE TRADITORE? 
This and other obstacles on which translators may stumble 
along the translating process did not deter nor hamper the bold 
translators of Vocabulaire juridique into English. The translated 
text is faithful not only to Cornu’s letter but also to his spirit, a feat 
in itself considering his high legal expectations and his writing 
style. It is in a class all by itself and sets the bar very high for 
future candidates envisaging to engage into such a hazardous 
endeavor: translating a law dictionary, whatever the language, 
without keeping in mind that translation cannot live forever if it is 
not assigned extreme, even impossible, challenges. This labor of 
Sisyphus that produced an English version of Vocabulaire 
juridique should captivate law students and professors, judges and 
attorneys, jurilinguists and translators, whether English or French-
speaking, in Louisiana and elsewhere in the legal sphere, interested 
in one way or another by civil law, its terms and notions, and by its 
unique way of expressing them. They will, no doubt, welcome and 
appreciate this great piece of inspiring translated doctrinal work, 
which, on top of that, is presented in the user-friendly format and 
text of Cornu’s Quadrige source text. Last but not least, they might 
get Cornu’s embedded message also carried by the translators of 
the Dictionary of the Civil Code: “remember the [civil law] 
style.”21 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. 
 21. Boyet: “I am much deceived but I remember the style” (Love’s Labour’s 
Lost, 4.1.96). 
